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This is the second of two articles comparing the canonical rule of
error and the American decisional and statutory rules of fraud in marriage. The first article, "Fraud and Error in the Canon Law of Marriage," appeared in I CATHOLIC LAWYER 83 (April, 1955).

MUTATIONS OF THE RULE
OF FRAUD IN MARRIAGE
WILLIAM
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CAHILL,
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Voidable Marriages: A Jurisdictional Concept

F ROM

earliest times until the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act of
1857,1 direct adjudication of the validity of marriage was reserved in
England to the ecclesiastical courts. It appears, however, that the lay
courts would find a marriage null on certain limited grounds, where that
finding was collateral to a question properly before the common law
courts or the Chancery. Of course, the finding of nullity of marriage was
res judicata only between the parties to the suit in which that finding had
been made. An example of such collateral finding is that of the New York
2
Chancellor in Aymar v. Roff.
Chancellor Kent ruled upon a form of marriage entered into by a girl
under the age of 12, "as a frolic." She had disavowed her act before the
Master of Rolls on her twelfth birthday, and again before the Chancellor
some ten days later. The relief prayed and granted was not a direct declaration of nullity, but a decree restraining the defendant from any contact
with the girl. It seems that the Chancellor founded his holding upon the
common law which, according to Blackstone,3 made void ab initio the
marriage of a girl under twelve.
A statute of Henry VIII, 4 whose direct purpose was to limit the extent
of certain canonical impediments to be adjudicated by the ecclesiastical
courts of the Anglican Church, had the indirect effect of clearly limiting
*Priest of the Diocese of Albany; Professor of Comparative Law in the Graduate
Division of the School of Law of St. John's University.
'20 & 21 Vict., c. 85.
2 3 Johns. Ch. 49 (N.Y. 1817).
BI. Comm. *436.
4

32 Henry VIII, c. 38 (1540).
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the respective competencies of the ecclesiastical and lay courts in matters of marriage.
The statute, in this latter respect, was not a
pure novelty, but it gave to the lay courts a
new power, predicated upon their acting to
enforce the Act of Parliament, to inhibit
petitioners from seeking decrees of nullity
in the ecclesiastical courts upon grounds
outside the statutory limits. More important
for our purposes here, the Henrician statute
limited collateral findings of nullity in the
lay courts to three grounds: want of age,
want of reason, and previous marriage with
the spouse surviving. To these, the Statute
4 & 5 Philip and Mary, c. 8, added the want
of consent of guardians of women less than
fifteen years of age. There the matter stood
in Blackstone's time, as he explains in Chapter 15 of his Commentaries.
Blackstone here introduces us to the
terminology of "void marriage" and "voidable marriage" which is to recur again and
again in the present discussion. In his time,
and in the common law received here at
the Revolution, a void marriage was one
whose nullity could be declared collaterally
in a lay court proceeding, while a voidable
marriage was one which could not be declared null except by an ecclesiastical judge.
Neither in the common law nor in the
Canon Law was any marriage which had
been valid at its inception capable of dissolution by court decree.
Canonical Rule: Void for
Fraud in the Factuni
Marriages alleged to be null for fraud
were to be adjudicated in the ecclesiastical
forum only; they could not be attacked, even
collaterally, in a proceeding before a lay
tribunal. If such question there arose, the
proceeding halted until determination of that
incidental question was had in the church
court. The rule on fraud, or more properly

LAWYER

the rule on error, in those courts, was the
same as that in the Code of Canon Law today. Marriage was a nullity if consent,
though apparent, was not real. Consent in
any of these four cases, and in these only,
was not real consent: consent not directed
to the person contemplated, consent directed
to a union other than marital, consent which
positive law made ineffective because based
upon error of servile status of the partner,
and consent vitiated by failure of a postulate
which had been made a condition sine qua
non.
In England the common usage was, even
when speaking of Canon Law, to employ
the term "fraud" instead of the canonically
correct term "error." Fraud, of course, involves elements referable to two persons,
the deceiver and the person deceived. The
elements of materiality, falsity, and reliance,
pertain to the victim's consent. That there
was factual misrepresentation, made scienter, with intent to cause the victim to act
thereon, has reference to the deceiver's
guilt. Because the object of inquiry of the
Canon Law in such cases of alleged nullity is
the act of consent, considerations referable
to the deceiver's guilt were not and are not
important. It is imperative to keep this distinction in mind when we set out to compare
the canonical rule in such cases with the
rules developed in American law. Also helpful to the reader whose background is the
common law is the similar distinction in
the common law of fraud: "Fraud in the
factum renders the writing void at law,
whereas fraud in the treaty renders it voidable merely."5 The "factum" here is the
marriage itself, created by consent of the
parties; the "treaty" here includes all acts by
which one is induced to consent to marriage,
' Whipple v. Brown Bros. Co., 225 N.Y. 237, 241,
121 N.E. 748, 749 (1919) (per Collins, J.).
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all acts by which his consent is procured. In
the Canons, marriage is valid and never
voidable where there is real consent to
marry; marriage is never void or voidable
because the real consent was procured or
induced by error or by fraud, except in the
statutory case of error as to slavery.

Direct Decrees of Nullity in
Early American Courts
In the early years of American independence, the state courts afforded in cases
of fraudulent marriage a single type of relief, the decree of nullity. There were not
then statutes, such as have been later enacted
in many of the states, authorizing divorce
where a man married in ignorance of his
wife's previous unchastity,6 or making a nullity ab initio and warranting divorce in any
marriage obtained by fraud,7 or empowering the court to make a marriage void by its
decree where consent thereto had been obtained by fraud. 8 Therefore, the theory
underlying the action was then in the American courts, as it had been in the ecclesiastical courts of England and as it is now in the
tribunals of the Catholic Church, a singular
and simple theory: where there was, through
fraud in the factum, an appearance of consent without its reality, there was a marriage
void ab initio.
In 1820, Chancellor Kent of New York
declared the nullity of a marriage which the
petitioner had entered while in a state of
mental derangement, from which state she
had recovered at the time of the action.9
Here, the Chancellor hesitated to decree
nullity upon the common law premises, for
the suit was "instituted purposely to declare
1 Md. Code 76, §25 (1860): Va. Code 530, §6
(1860).
' Ga. Code §§30-102, 30-103, 30-104.
'N.Y. Rev. Stat., Pt. 11,
c. 8, tit. 1, §4 (1828).
'Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343 (N.Y.
1820).
6

such a marriage void."' 10 He therefore predicated his decree upon the general powers of
chancery in reference to lunatics. That
jurisdiction, he asserts, was inherent in
chancery, though direct adjudication of nullity of marriage was reserved, in England,
to the ecclesiastical courts. Kent's assumption is that in America, where no ecclesiastical courts are established by municipal law,
the latent matrimonial aspect of the chancery jurisdiction of lunacy must be considered to come into free operation.
His successor, Chancellor Sanford, in
Ferlatv. Goian," makes a similar argument
to establish his power of decreeing nullity
of a marriage contracted under fraud and
duress. Here it is the general power of chancery to adjudge the nullity of contracts
fraudulently executed, which is extended to
decree a marriage void, where, "in England, the ecclesiastical courts would have
cognizance of such a question and would
annul the marriage. '' 12 Sanford's finding of
fact is well within the rule of fraud in the
English ecclesiastical courts: "though she
gave an apparent consent at the moment of
the celebration, yet it fully appears that this
consent was feigned

. . .

and that this mar-

riage was a foul fraud practiced upon her by
the defendant." 13
In Clark v. Field,14 the Supreme Court of
Vermont, on an appeal from chancery,
reached a result quite similar as extending
chancery jurisidiction of void contracts to
declare nullity of a marriage celebrated without real consent. The woman there was
shown to have understood and intended, to
the knowledge of the man, that she was not
married by the ceremony unless they should
o Id. at 346.
"1 Hopk. Ch. 478 (N.Y. 1825).
"Id. at 495.
Id. at 493.
"13 Vt. 460 (1841).
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have another solemnization. The court
makes the point that she did not consent to
marriage in praesenti.'5
Chancellor Zabriskie of New Jersey, in
McClurg v. Terry,' 6 found that he had authority to declare void a marriage solemnized by the parties acting in jest. He relied
upon the construction of chancery powers
in the Ferlat and Clark cases, and invoked a
grant implied in the State Constitution,
where the Chancellor was vested with chancery powers withdrawn from the legislature.
The legislature had had power to declare
7
marriages void.1
The New York Chancellors had gone
beyond the powers of the lay judges of
England. Kent's holding of nullity in the
Wightman case was not collateral to the issuance of an injunction, as his finding of
nullity in the Aymar case had been. The decision in Wightman v. Wightman was a direct adjudication of the nullity of a lunatic's
marriage. Sanford, finding nullity for fraud
and duress in the Ferlat case, went further
and invaded the class of marriages which, in
Blackstone's classification,' 8 were voidable
only.
Kent, speaking obiter in the Wightman
case, had speculated that an American chancellor might declare null any marriage contracted contrary to natural law.' 9 But
Sanford held that the chancery powers over
lunatics' contracts and to declare nullity of
contracts void for fraud or duress marked
the limit of the New York chancellor's
power to adjudicate directly nullity of marriage. He therefore found he had not jurisdiction to declare the nullity of a marriage in
Id. at 475.

which the husband was alleged to be impotent. 20 Referring to the Wightman and
Ferlatcases, he said, "These marriages were
clearly void; and this court pronounced the
sentence of nullity. If these two decrees are
denominated divorces, they do not arrogate
to this court any general power of divorce,
2t
in cases not prescribed by our statutes."
New York Statute: Voidable
Means Rescissible
The New York divorce statute to which
Sanford referred had been enacted in
1787; 2 the sole ground in the statute was
adultery. Another statute, enacted in
1788,23 implied that the courts had power of
declaring nullity of marriage, as it exempted
from the penalties of bigamy a person who
remarried "where the former marriage hath
been or shall be, by the sentence or decree
of any such court, declared to be void and
of no effect." The Commissioners to Revise
the Statute Laws noted Sanford's holding in
the Burtis case, "that the whole jurisdiction
of the court of chancery in relation to marriage, except where the contract is void on
the same ground that other contracts may
be avoided, is conferred and limited by
statute. '24 They recommended that, in several specified circumstances, the marriage
be in law, not absolutely void, but "void
from the time its nullity shall be declared
25
by a court of competent jurisdiction."
Included in this section, as enacted, were
marriages contracted in want of age or
understanding, in want of physical capacity,
and "when the consent of either party shall

"'21 N.J. Eq. (6 C.E. Greene) 225 (1870).

'Burtis v. Burtis, IHopk. Ch. 557 (N.Y. 1825).
Id. at 567.
2' Laws of N.Y. 1787, c. 69.

" Id. at 229.
I B1. Comm. *434 et seq.
Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343, 347351 (N.Y. 1820).

"Laws of N.Y. 1788, c. 24.
" 2 N.Y. State Comm'rs to Revise the Statute
Laws on N. Y., Report 2 (1828).
25Ibid.

21
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have been obtained by force or fraud. ''2- 1
The Revisors' note points out "some of these
marriages are absolutely void, by the existing law (referring to Blackstone, Commentaries, c. 15). But it is believed that the
interests of society and of the parties concerned, will be best promoted by placing
2 -7
them on the ground stated in this section."
Clearly, then, the purpose and effect of the
Revised Statutes were to make such marriages voidable only, that is to say, they were
to be valid for all purposes in the law unless
and until a competent court should "declare
'28
their nullity."
The New York law on fraudulent marriage here departed from the theory underlying Sanford's decision in the Ferlat case,
which same theory he expounded more fully
in the Burtis opinion. The motives for the
change may have been good and proper in
the judgment of the Revisors and of the
Legislature. It has been suggested that the
motives were to afford the court more effective means of enforcing marital obligations
and of controlling collusive actions, especially where fraud or duress was the ground
asserted. But we are directly concerned here,
not with the sociological motives, but with
the juridical effect of the change. Fraudulent
marriage, under this New York statute, was
no longer void, and there was now no necessity that the fraud be proved to have such
character as to make away with "the reality
of consent." The consent might be real
enough, but if it were fraudulently obtained,
it would be good ground for a decree. We
will later trace the vagaries of the New York
rule of fraud which followed upon this departure from true declarations of nullity as
""N.Y. Rev. Stat., Pt. II, c. 8, tit. 1, §4 (1828).
"2 N.Y. State Comm'rs to Revise the State Laws
on N.Y., Report 3 (1828).
2 Ci. I Bishop, Marriage and Divorce §§258, 259
(1891); 1 BI. Comm.* 434.

the proper remedy in such cases and from
the theory that marriage procured by fraud
was either void ab initio or it was valid.
New Jersey Case: Rescission
by Chancery Power
A similar result was obtained in New
Jersey without aid of a statute.29 The magic
there was worked by invocation of two lines
of cases which are fundamentally incompatible. Judge Van Syckle, in dissent, remarks, "The cases (which we have listed as
the second line) ...are under a statute extending divorce power to cases of fraud, and
30
are, therefore, of no authority here."
The first line of cases comprises those
used above to indicate development of the
doctrine that chancery is competent to declare on marriages void ab initio because
there was no real, but only apparent consent. 31 The second line of cases was decided
under statutes which empowered the courts
to grant divorce, or to dissolve marriage, or
to annul, as of the time of the decree, marriages in which consent had been obtained
2
by fraud.3
The radical fallacy lies, as Van Syckle
pointed out, in confusing decrees of divorce
or dissolution with simple declarations of
the fact of nullity. Though the Massachusetts
statute spoke of marriages "supposed to be
void, or the validity ... doubted, either for
fraud or any legal cause," 33 the court said in
the Reynolds case, "The statute does not
v. Carris, 24 N.J. Eq. (9 C.E. Greene)
516 (1873).

'Carris

Id. at 532.
See notes I, 8, 10, 13, 15 supra.
Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87 (1859); Ritter v.
Ritter, 5 Blackf. 81 (Ind. 1839); Morris v. Morris,
Wright 630 (Ohio Ch. 1834); Donovan v. Donovan, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 140 (1864); Reynolds v.
Reynolds, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 605 (1862).
' Mass. Stat. 1855, c. 27, reenacted in Gen. Stat.
c. 107, §4.
'o
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provide that fraud shall vitiate a contract of
marriage, but only confers an authority on
the court to decree a dissolution of the marriage for such cause, as in other cases of
nullity."'" And the California statute "...
provided that a divorce might be granted
'when the consent of either of the parties
to the marriage was obtained by force or
fraud, upon the application of the injured
The Indiana statute upon which
party.' ,,3.
was based the decision in Ritter v. Ritter,:"!
which case is cited in the Reynolds decision,
"enacts that the Circuit Courts shall have
power to grant divorces for any other cause,
and in any other case, where the Court, in
their discretion, shall consider it reasonable
and proper. . . .' "" We have not seen the report of the Morris case, 38 also cited in Reynolds v. Reynolds, but Justice Field says of
Since in all
it, "A divorce was decreed.... ,,39
these cases, the court is not declaring a factual nullity but decreeing a dissolution, we
must insist that the requirement that real
consent shall have been lacking at the time of
celebration is quite beside the point. If the
court were to declare that the marriage is in
fact a nullity, it must find such fraud as made
the consent ineffective from the beginning.
But if the court is presuming to dissolve a
marriage, it need not find lack of true consent; it is free, upon this premise, to dissolve
the marriage or not according as it finds or
does not find circumstances of injustice, inequity or even of hardship connected with
the fraud and sufficient to motivate reasonably the use of discretion.
The cases of this second line, like the case
before the New Jersey Court of Errors, were
of a peculiar type. All involved concealment
L5

Reynolds v. Reynolds, supra note 32 at 606.
Baker v. Baker, supra note 32 at 102.

Supra note 32.
Id. at 82.
" Supra note 32.
Baker v. Baker. sutpra note 32 at 104.
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of premarital pregnancy by a man other than
the complainant, who had had no carnal
knowledge of his future wife. All the cases
advert to the horrendous result of sustaining
the marriage. The innocent dupe would be
forced to maintain bastardy proceedings to
free himself from responsibility for the child
thrust upon him, and be bound thereafter to
the woman he had thus publicly pilloried; or
he must in secret bitterness maintain the
child as his own. If ever there was an example of the old saw "hard cases make bad
law," it is here. That they are hard cases goes
without saying.
Reynolds v. Reynolds:
the Essentials Enlarged
The making of a bad law is most clearly
illustrated in the decisions of Chief Justice
Bigelow in the Reynolds and Donovan matters. He draws a clear distinction in the
Donovan opinion between the rules of evidence to be employed and the rule of materiality to be applied. As to the first, "In
determining on the validity of such contract,
in order to ascertain whether it shall be
adjudged void on the ground of fraud under
Gen. Sts. c. 107, §4, the same rules of evidence are to be applied as to other civil contracts."' 45 As to the second, "There must be
satisfactory proof either of misrepresentation or concealment of some essential fact
•.. a particular fact which formed the basis
or contributed an essential ingredient to the
contract. . . .The fact that the respondent
was pregnant with child by a man other than
the petitioner at the time the contract of
marriage was entered into was material, and
went to the essence of the contract. This was
settled on full consideration in Reynolds v.
Reynolds."" In the Reynolds case, he had
said, "Nothing can then avoid it which does
4oDonovan v. Donovan, supra note 32.
,1Ibid.
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not amount to a fraud in the essentialia of
the marriage relation." 4'1 2 He had ruled out
concealment of unchastity and false representations of virtue as going to the essentialia, but he went on to assert, "It is not
going too far to say, that a woman who has
not only submitted to the embraces of another man, but who also bears in her womb
the fruit of such illicit intercourse, has during the period of her gestation incapacitated
herself from making and executing a valid
contract of marriage with a man who takes
her as his wife in ignorance of her condition
and on the faith of representationsthat she
is chaste and virtuous. In such a case, the
concealment and false statement go directly
to the essentials of the marriage contract.
"". We have supplied emphasis in the
quotation to point out what seems to be the
only fulcrum of reasoned argument. It repeats in substance the argument of Justice
Field in Baker v. Baker.44 It assumes the old
ecclesiastical rule that the marriage is void
ab initio where real consent is lacking, but
we submit that it misapplies the rule. Where
a party is truly and permanently impotent at
the time of marriage, there might be made
out an argument that real consent was lacking; one may be said to be incapable of consenting to do what he is incapable of doing.
But that a woman who is now capable of
intercourse, though for a time incapable of
conceiving the child of her husband, is incapable of consenting to marriage certainly
does not follow. If it did follow, no sterile
woman would be capable of marital consent,
and even one presently incapable of intercourse by reason of temporary illness could
not validly marry.
The Civilians' Rule
The Chief Justice of Massachusetts reReynolds v. Reynolds. supra note 32 at 608.
'I Id. at 609.

13 Cal. 87, 103 (1859).

jects as too severe the opinion of the commentators on the civil law to the effect that
premarital unchastity of a woman is good
ground for "impeaching and vacating the
marriage." 4 5. Bigelow cites "Voet, 24, 2, 15"
as supporting that view which he rejects.
Yet when we turn to the writings of the
Dutch jurist at the place cited we find that
Voet's case is the same as Bigelow's: "On
the petition of one party, marriage should
be declared null by the public authority
whenever one has in ignorance married a
woman corrupted and made pregnant by
another, if, after discovering her violation,
he has not cohabited with her or in any
other way forgiven the offense."'4 6 Voet's
minor premise is the same as Bigelow's:
that the husband's error concerns a matter
which goes to the essence of marriage. It
seems not impertinent that we examine
Voet's development of the argument.47
Voet points out that such a marriage is
held valid in the Canon Law of the Catholic Church. 48 Voet argues that it should not
be so because the Canon Law held invalid
a marriage contracted by a freeman with a
slave, if the free person were ignorant of
the other's servile condition. 49 He ignores
the fact that Catholic theologians and canonists have always held that the nullity of
such a marriage does not result from any
natural insufficiency of the freeman's consent, but from a positive impediment estab" Reynolds v. Reynolds, supra note 32 at 608.
"4 Voet, Commentarius ad Pandictas 127 (4th
ed. Bassoni, Remonini, 1827).
"7The views expressed by Voet were also expressed
by Beza and Brouwer. According to Philip A.
Putnam, Assistant Librarian of the Harvard Law
School Library, the works of all three jurists were
accessible to Chief Justice Bigelow at the library
in Cambridge in 1862.
4 c. Quod autem, C. 29, q. 1, of the Decree of
Gratian.
3, 4 C. 29, q. 2; compare Canon 1083, §2 n.
2, C.I.C.
4'cc.
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lished by church law." Voet bolsters his
argument by an appeal to the Roman Law "
which permitted an action for restitution to
the buyer of a woman slave represented to
be a virgin but found not to be in that condition. Surely the case is not parallel. A man
marrying establishes a peculiar personal relation between himself and the woman he
marries; there is no such personal relation
between the buyer and the property he purchases. Further, it is not clear that the buyer's action for restitution indicates that the
sale was a nullity; rather it seems to have
imposed an affirmative duty upon the seller
to hand back the price upon surrender of
the slave. Finally, Voet relies upon the text
of Deuteronomy, 22; 20,21 and the Novella
(93) of the Emperor Leo. The Scripture
text, especially when compared with other
verses in the same chapter where similar
penalties of death were imposed upon the
guilty woman whether she was actually
married or only espoused, whereas such sins
when committed by girls who were neither
married nor engaged were not punished by
death, indicates that the offense is technically an adultery. The usual bill of divorce
is not mentioned, for the woman is executed
immediately upon her conviction. The Emperor's decree had no reference to voiding
or dissolving a marriage, but permitted an
offended fiance to rescind his engagement
2
and refuse to marry the violated woman.1
Not all the classical Protestant jurists
were of Voet's opinion. Pufendorf remarks
upon the law of Deuteronomy discussed
above, calling it "Jewish civil Law, '" and
"very peculiar." His'exposition of the "law
' Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Suppl. Q. 52 A. 2, 6.
' Digest 19. 1. 11.5.
12 3 Corpus Juris Civilis

823 (Leipzig, 1854).
"'Pufendorf, Of The Law of Nature and Nations
587 (4th ed., Kennett transl., 1729). The phrase
suggests that Pufendorf believed the law was intended to operate only within the Jewish nation.

of nature" runs very close to what we have
seen to be the Canon Law: "In like manner, if there were a Mistake, either as to
the Person, the Object of Consent, or in
any Quality, either relating to Matrimony
itself, or serving as a Condition on which
the Consent was built . . . the contract
was manifestly void."5 4
The New York Rules
Because the relief of annulment of marriage for fraud has had its widest use and
broadest development in New York, our
discussion of the mutations of the materiality rule in such actions will be limited
to the jurisprudence of that state only. In
the New York courts, it seems, four general rules of materiality have operated: the
essentialia rule, the consent rule, the Griffin rule, and the rule of matters vital to
the consent.
Fraud Going to the
Essence of the Contract
The essentialia rule is perhaps most
clearly stated in Fisk v. Fisk.5 " There it
was said, "the rule is well settled that no
fraud will avoid a marriage which does not
go to the very essence of the contract, and
which is not in its nature such a thing as
either would prevent the party from entering into the marriage relation, or, having
entered into it, would preclude performance
of the duties which the law and custom
imposes upon the husband or the wife as a
party to that contract."'5 , In that case, the
defendant wife had been previously martied and validly divorced, while the plaintiff supposed she had never been married;
she was, therefore, in the law, capable of
marriage with him, and so relief was
'4Ibid.
6 App. Div. 432, 39 N.Y. Supp. 537 (Ist Dep't
1896).
Id. at 434, 39 N.Y. Supp. at 539 (emphasis
added).
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denied. The holding had been the same in
an earlier similar case.5 7 But the second
marriage was bigamous and void where
the divorced person was under prohibition
to marry,58 and where the defendant had
left a wife abroad and it was not known
whether she was alive or dead when he
remarried. 9
It was held that the defendant was incapacitated for marriage where she was pregnant by another at the time.60 Marriage was
annulled where one party had, when marrying, intentions to reject the marital obligations totally, 6 ' or with reference to the pro62
creation of children.
Venereal disease has been held to inca4
3
pacitate a person for marriage. Sterility
and that sort of epilepsy which does not
7

Clarke v. Clarke, 11 Abb. Pr. 228 (N.Y. 1860).

'Blank v. Blank, 107 N.Y. 91, 13 N.E. 615
(1887); Roth v. Roth, 97 Misc. 136, 161 N.Y.
Supp. 99 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
' Minner v. Minner, 238 N.Y. 529, 144 N.E. 181
(1924).
' Shrady v. Logan, 17 Misc. 329, 40 N.Y. Supp.
1010 (Sup. Ct. 1896); cf. Reynolds v. Reynolds,
supra note 32.
61

Feynman v. Feynman, 168 Misc. 210, 4 N.Y.S.
2d 787 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Lewine v. Lewine, 170
Misc. 120, 9 N.Y.S. 2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Ryan
v. Ryan, 156 Misc. 251, 281 N.Y. Supp. 709 (Sup.
Ct. 1935); Sheridan v. Sheridan, 186 N.Y. Supp.
470 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Moore v. Moore, 94 Misc.
370, 157 N.Y. Supp. 819 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Robert
v. Robert, 87 Misc. 629, 150 N.Y. Supp. 366 (Sup.
Ct. 1914).
62 Coppo v. Coppo, 163 Misc. 249, 297 N.Y. Supp.

744 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Miller v. Miller, 132 Misc.
121, 228 N.Y. Supp. 657 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
' Meyer v. Meyer, 49 How Pr. 311 (N.Y. 1875).
"Chavias v. Chavias. 194 App. Div. 904, 184
N.Y. Supp. 761 (2d Dep't 1920): Wendel v.
Wendel, 30 App. Div. 477, 52 N.Y. Supp. 72 (2d
Dep't 1898); Schroter v. Schroter, 56 Misc. 69,
106 N.Y. Supp. 22 (Sup. Ct. 1907); Devanbagh
v. Devanbagh, 5 Paige Ch. 554 (N.Y. 1836).

render sexual relations dangerous 6 5 do not
incapacitate a person for marriage.
It was held that the plaintiff, who, because of her religious beliefs, felt she could
not permit sexual relations to a man she
had married in a civil ceremony, was bound
to the marriage though he refused religious
solemnization. 66
It will be seen that the statement of the
essentialia rule in the Fisk case brings it
well within the ancient rule that there is
nullity where consent is only apparent and
not real. Some of the applications cited are
not within the Canon Law rule of substantial error because they go beyond the
canonical concept of matrimonial capacity,
as in the case of a divorced person whose
spouse survives; or because they are premised on facts which in the canonical view
are not substantial to the marital relation,
such as pregnancy at the time of marriage
and venereal infection; or because the substantial nature of the canonical requirement of religious celebration is not recognized. In spite of such applications of the
rule, the spirit of the ancient principle survives where the object of inquiry is a fraud
touching the "factum" of the contract, and
causing nullity ab initio.
Fraud Procuring the Consent
The consent rule, as usually stated and
applied, looks to fraud in the "treaty,"
which fraud is said to warrant dissolution
or rescission of the marriage. In DiLorenzo
v. DiLorenzo,6 7 the court declared, "it is
sufficient that we rely upon the plain pro' Lapides v. Lapides. 254 N.Y. 73. 171 N. E. 911
(1930); McGill v. McGill. 179 App. Div. 343.
166 N.Y. Supp. 397 (4th Dep't 1917). afl'd men..
226 N.Y. 673, 123 N.E. 877 (1919).
0' Mirizio v. Mirizio. 242 N.Y. 74, 84, 150 N.E.
605, 609 (1926).
6' 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63 (1903).
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vision of our statute and upon the application to the case of a contract of marriage
of those salutary and fundamental rules,
which are applicable to contracts generally
when determining the validity. If the plaintiff proves to the satisfaction of the court
that, through misrepresentation of some
fact, which was an essential element in the
giving of his consent to the contract of marriage and which was of such a nature as
to deceive an ordinarily prudent person, he
has been victimized, the court is empowered to annul the marriage."6 8
Decree of annulment was here granted,
as the man's consent to marry was procured by false representations that he was
father of the child of which the woman had
been delivered before the marriage. The
court found that the plaintiff had had a
"right to rely" upon the woman's statement, though an earlier case" 9 had denied
a man such relief where he (like the plaintiff in DiLorenzo's case) had had warning
of the woman's bad character through her
submission to him in pre-marital relations.
That earlier view was adopted by the Supreme Court in a 1933 decision 70 notwithstanding the ruling in DiLorenzo.
Domschke v. Domschke71 extended the
DiLorenzo rule to a woman's representation that she had been married and had
borne her child in wedlock, where she had
never been other than mistress to the
child's father.
Concealment of prior divorce was held
material under this rule, though the person
Id. at 474-475, 67 N.E. at 65.
'Tait v. Tait, 3 Misc. 218, 23 N.Y. Supp. 597

78

(Super.Ct. 1893).

-0Donovan v. Donovan, 147 Misc. 134, 263 N.Y.
Supp. 336 (Sup. Ct. 1933).

" 138 App. Div. 454, 122 N.Y. Supp. 892 (2d
Dep't 1910).

who had obtained the decree was clearly
not legally incapable of contracting a second time.7 2 There was a similar holding
where the defendant had concealed annul73
ment of an earlier marriage.
Where the man had concealed a disease
involving sterility after the woman had inquired of his capacity to beget a child, an74
nulment was granted.
Even before the DiLorenzo case, courts
of first instance had held that the continuance of criminal activity after marriage
gave ground for an annulment action by
the other party, 75 though that view had
been reproved by the judges of the Appellate Division in the Fisk opinion. 76 After
the DiLorenzo case was decided, the Appellate Division found no difficulty in granting annulments where the fraud had to do
with criminal character, at least when the
criminality was found to be of a particularly aggravated sort: drug addiction 77 and
78
a record of seven felony convictions.
Without discussing the question of incapacity to contract, the court found that
failure to disclose an infection of venereal
disease, though there had been no inquiry
and no affirmative representation, would be
72 Costello

v. Costello, 155 Misc. 28, 279 N.Y.

Supp. 303 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
"Weill v. Weill, 104 Misc. 561, 172 N.Y. Supp.
589 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
" Williams v. Williams, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 611 (Sup.
Ct. 1939).
" King v. Brewer, 8 Misc. 587, 29 N.Y. Supp. 1114
(Super. Ct. 1894); Keyes v. Keyes, 6 Misc. 355,
26 N.Y. Supp. 910 (Super. Ct. 1893).
" Fisk v. Fisk, 6 App. Div. 432, 436, 39 N.Y.

Supp. 537, 540 (1st Dep't 1896).
71 O'Connell

v. O'Connell, 201 App. Div. 338, 194
N.Y. Supp. 265 (1st Dep't 1922).
78Harris v. Harris, 201 App. Div. 880, 193 N.Y.
Supp. 936 (1st Dep't 1922).
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sufficient fraud to warrant annulment of
79
marriage.
A 1928 statute8 0 gave to the sane spouse
an action for dissolution when the other
was insane at the time of marriage or later.
In adjudicating a marriage contracted before this enactment it was held that if the
defendant had suffered insanity before the
marriage, but being sane at that time, concealed the earlier affliction, there was fraud
sufficient to warrant annulment. 8'
If there had been justified reliance upon
a misrepresentation of intent to have a religious ceremony - not a sincere promise
later broken82' - the court found such fraud
as would ground action for annulment."'
The Griffin Rule
"The Griffin rule"8 4 had a short life. It
applied to unconsummated marriages the
DiLorenzo standard and to consummated
marriages a rule of public policy stated
in terms of the essentials of the marital
status.8 - It was formulated in Special Term,
and was never directly embraced by the
Court of Appeals or by the Appellate Division. The courts had for many years invoked the distinction between causes sufficient to annul an unconsummated marriage
and those required where the marriage con-

tract "had ripened into the marital status."
Actually it was no more than a policy statement, for it is a commonplace that the
parties have all the rights and duties of
status immediately upon a valid contract., '
The Griffin rule, when it was stated in
1924, seemed to offer a formula for some
restraint upon the almost pure common
contract doctrine advanced in DiLorenzo,
and followed in the Svenson and Domschke
cases. Only one recent case invokes the
Griffin rule, and it is there applied in rejecting a petition alleging misrepresentation in
pre-marital promises of the woman to remain a dutiful wife. Apparently the marriage had been consummated, and the court
held that in the circumstance fraud was not
material unless it went to the essentials of
the contract.87
Fraud in an Element
Vital to Consent
The field seems now to be held by the
"vital consent" rule. The older public policy doctrine, stated in Keyes v. Keyes,""
was recalled in Sobol v. Sobol8 9 and was
restated by the Court of Appeals in Lapides
v. Lapides,90 in the following terms, "While
tile law books may treat marriage as a civil

'"Jacobson v. Jacobson. 207 App. Div. 238, 202
N.Y. Supp. 96 (2d Dep't 1923).
" Laws of N.Y. 1928. c. 589, incorporated in N.Y.

contract, yet it is a contract which the public is interested in preserving. The fraud
which may dissolve the marriage tie must
relate to something vital." 91

Dom. Re]. Law §7(5).
SAlter v. Alter, 250 App. Div. 428, 294 N.Y.

s'See Schonfeld v. Schonfeld, 260 N.Y. 477, 482,
184 N.E. 60, 62 (1933) (dissenting opinion).

Supp. 195 (2d Dep't 1937).
s Schachter v.Schachter, 109 Misc. 152, 178 N.Y.
Supp. 212 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
' Rutstein v.Rutstein, 221 App. Div. 70, 222 N.Y.
Supp. 688 (1st Dep't 1927).
" So called in Gershenson, Fraud in the New York
Law of Annulment, 9 B'klyn L. Rev. 51 (1939).

s'Washburn v. Washburn, 62 N.Y.S. 2d 569 (Sup.

5

Griffin v. Griffin, 122 Misc. 837, 204 N.Y. Supp.
131 (Sup. Ct.), af0'd inem., 209 App. Div. 883,
205 N.Y. Supp. 926 (2d Dep't 1924).

Ct. 1946).
6 Misc. 355, 26 N.Y. Supp. 910 (Super. Ct.
1893).
s"'88 Misc. 277, 279, 150 N.Y. Supp. 248, 249
(Sup. Ct. 1914).
°254 N.Y. 73, 171 N.E. 911 (1930).
1

1d. at 80, 171 N.E. at 913.
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Some of the misrepresentations which
have been held vital in recent cases are
these: the man had said he would afford
a good home for the middle-aged woman
and her children in a congenial atmosphere;92 the wife who had been silent before
marriage on the matter of children, afterward insisted on the right to decide when
she should become pregnant; 93 concealment
of guilt of the crime of rape struck directly
at the happiness of the marital relation,
though nine years had elapsed since the
4
marriage.9
The courts have held the following misrepresentations not vital: as to wealth, family, social position, and that the man, before
marriage, had not accepted money from
other women; 95 that the man was of Polish
descent when actually he was German;""';
failure to disclose mental illness, not in the
person married, but in members of the
family.97
It was said that there was no right to
rely on representations that there would be
a religious ceremony later, as the petitioner
had not exercised the care of an ordinarily
prudent person to determine the genuinity
of the other's willingness to have the ceremony.98 It was held to be contrary to public
policy to grant an annulment because a
vife after marriage refused to keep a premarital promise. She had said that for the
'-Waff v. Waft, 189 Misc. 372, 71 N.Y.S. 2d 775
(Sup. Ct. 1947).
0 Schulman v. Schulman, 180 Misc. 904, 46 N.Y.S.
2d 158 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
" Giannotti v. Giannotti, 60 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (Sup.
Ct. 1946).
00Woronzoff-Daschkoff

v. Woronzoff-Daschkoff,

303 N.Y. 506, 104 N.E. 2d 877 (1952).

'Pawloski

v. Pawloski, 65 N.Y.S. 2d 413 (Sup.

Ct. 1946).
"Natoli v. Natoli, 72 N.Y.S. 2d 708 (Sup. Ct.
1947).
" Vonbiroganio v. Von Brock, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 885
(Sup. Ct. 1946).

sake of her husband's happiness, she would
give in adoption another man's child of
which she was pregnant at the time of her
marriage. 9
There was found to be no fraud on the
petitioner where, though a previous marriage was concealed on the license application, the fact had been known to him; 100
nor where the woman married knowing the
man drank, though it was only after marriage she discovered he had been twice convicted for intoxication more than five years
before the marriage. 10'
The Right to Rely and
Conditioned Consent
The basic doctrine of the consent rule as
enunciated in the DiLorenzo case, that
failure of a motive or cause for which one
consents to the marriage will make the
marriage voidable, is rejected by the Canon
Law, as it was in the common law. But
those cases under the consent rule which
predicate the "right to rely" upon a representation made after inquiry follow a rationale not entirely dissimilar from that of
the canonists treating of marriage made
void by failure of a condition sine qua non.
Thus, the Domschke decision intimates that
a man may stipulate for the chastity of the
woman he marries.10 2 The Williams decision found that the woman had inquired of
her fiance's ability to beget a child.' 03 In
the Smith case, there had been particular
inquiry as to the health of the woman, and
Kingsbury v. Kingsbury, 75 N.Y.S. 2d 699 (Sup.
Ct. 1947).
1
"Factor v. Factor, 184 Misc. 861, 55 N.Y.S. 2d
183 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
10' Trefry v. Trefry, 189 Misc. 1013, 76 N.Y.S. 2d
323 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
v. Domschke, 138 App. Div. 454,
102Domschke
457, 122 N.Y. Supp. 892, 895 (2d Dep't 1910).
103Williams v. Williams, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 611, 613
(Sup. Ct. 1939).
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as to the presence of "anything going to
04
come between us to make life unhappy.'
None of these circumstances, upon its face,
indicates clearly a determination in the
mind of the injured party to contract marriage only if the other were chaste, or fertile, or in sound mental health. But all of
them suggest a doubt entertained before
marriage concerning the condition inquired
of, and with proper evidence it might have
been shown that the doubt had been so
serious and the determination so strong
that the condition made an object of inquiry had been made also an effective condition sine qua non.
Conclusions
The present New York situation pleases
no one. So small a proportion of the decided cases are reported that it is practically impossible to determine with certainty
what rules or policies are generally controlling in the decisions of the trial judges.
Some of those who advocate as an ultimate
desideratum a "legal provision for divorce by mutual consent" limited only by
use of a conciliation service, provision for
the children's welfare and fair adjustment
of property rights, complain that some trial
judges are applying the "essentialia" rule of
materiality and "imposing unjustifiably
severe moral standards as a basis for finding the petitioner's hands too 'unclean' for
relief in equity."'"" Others feel that the
findings of trial courts sometimes exceed
even the limits of the very liberal rule of
considerations "vital" to the consent, and
that the standards of proof are often very
low.
Whatever be the fact as to the actual
practice of the trial judges, it seems clear
v. Smith, 112 Misc. 371, 373, 184 N.Y.
Supp. 134, 136 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
1 See Note, 48 Col. L. Rev. 900, 915-917 (1948).
'"' Smith

that the rule recognized by the appellate
courts, requiring that the fraud be "vital"
to the consent, affords no clearly objective
standard for limiting the pure "consent"
rule laid down in the DiLorenzo case.
Whether or not the inferior courts are actually attempting to apply the standards
established, there is no doubt that the standards themselves are so broad as to give the
judges a scope of discretion which has little
limit short of their views of social expediency. The judges have now, in the area of
fraud, a power, which in 1827 was exercised by the legislature, to regulate marriage under no more definite standard than
the "interests of society and of the parties
concerned."1'0
The logic of this development was inexorable, if not always obvious, once the
law departed from the canonical and common law concept that marriage validly contracted cannot be avoided or dissolved. The
07
fallacy pointed out by Judge Van Syckle'
which confuses the decree of nullity with
decrees of divorce or dissolution, has entrapped our people and our legislature by
causing them to insist upon a strict divorce
statute while accepting complacently an annulment statute whose limits are as vague
in doctrine as they are vagrant in application. And the fallacy has so ensnared
some of our legal minds that they reject or
at least fail to comprehend a principle once
a commonplace in marriage law and still
clearly effective in contract and agency doctrines: that a contractual or consensual relation is radically void and a nullity always
if, and only if, the consent of the parties is
wanting.
2 N.Y. State Comm'rs to Revise the Statute
Laws on N.Y., Report 3 (1828).
107Carris v. Carris. 24 N.J. Eq. (9 C.E. Greene)
'°

516, 532 (1873).
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